Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morality (No! Not Morals!)

I. Morality in the Traditional Sense

What does he refer to when he uses the term ‘morality’? There is an obvious way in which Nietzsche uses the term, namely as referring to what Brian Leiter has called “Morality in the Pejorative Sense” or, as I shall call it in the following, traditional morality.

Confusingly, Nietzsche’s discussion of traditional morality commences from two distinct starting points, which are merged with the introduction of a set of criteria by which – without prejudging the issue in question – each branch can be measured. The first branch (a) is concerned with the conditions and circumstances under which traditional moral values arose and developed, while the second branch (b) investigates the notion of traditional morality itself, and is hence concerned with its theoretical implications and content.